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cerned with what rabbis said in late antiquity and the Middle Ages?
After suggesting two answers to my own question, I’ll turn to some re-
flections on the “Post-biblical Interpretations” themselves.
First, I want to point out that the content of the “Post-biblical
Interpretations” essays is drawn overwhelmingly from Second Tem-
ple literature, the literature of
Hazal
,
and the writings of
post-Talmudic medieval scholars. (
Hazal
is a Hebrew acronym that
stands for the phrase “
hahameinu zikhronam l’vrakhah
,”
or “our Sages
of blessed memory”).
Hazal
are the rabbis of the
Talmuds
and the clas-
sical
midrash
compilations. The literature of
Hazal
,
the great legal
writings of the Middle Ages, medieval Bible commentary, and the
mystical literature, are an indispensable part of our Jewish religious,
cultural, and spiritual DNA.
Hazal
and the medieval scholars made us
the Jews we are, and created the Judaism – Rabbinic Judaism – to
which all contemporary Jews are heir. Without this rabbinic heritage,
we wouldn’t have the
seder
,
Hanukkah,
the structure of the prayer-ser-
vice, or numerous other aspects of what makes a Jewish life
recognizably Jewish.
Moreover, Jews have read the
Torah
–
indeed, the entire Bible –
through the lens of rabbinic interpretation for well over 1,000 years.
Late antique and medieval rabbinic interpretation made that sacred
but often strange Near Eastern text speak to Jews living under pagan
and Christian Rome, and in Babylonia, the medieval Christian and
Muslim worlds, and eventually the NewWorld. Second, Judith Baskin
rightly pointed in her introductory essay (“Women and Post-biblical
Commentary”) to the multivocality of rabbinic literature – that is, it
includes (literally) many voices. Not only that, but this literature
demonstrates to us that multivocality is ok – there may be a certain
tension inherent in living with different and even conflicting view-
points, but it can be done. Not only is it possible to live with the
tensions presented by multivocality, but we
should
do so, since it is
unreasonable to expect human minds to be forced to conform to any
one point of view. It was likely for that reason that even the great me-
dieval law codes became surrounded by commentary – Jewish scholars
seemingly couldn’t bear the notion of not being allowed or expected
to argue and present different views. Classical Jewish literature and
the myriad viewpoints it presents – and the fact that it even does so –
should be studied and appreciated by everyone.
Apropos of multivocality, it’s time to move on to the
Commen-
tary
.
In examining a selection of the “Post-biblical Interpretations”
essays, I’ve been struck by a few things. First, the essays in the
Com-
mentary
are neither apologetic about nor dismissive of rabbinic
literature; they tell the truth. The essays do not censor the ancient and
medieval rabbis in their more baldly patriarchal moments, nor do they
accentuate the negative in order to condemn the rabbinic enterprise.
We see here a third and better way for liberal Jewish women and men
to read rabbinic literature: reading with openness to
all
that the liter-
ature has to say, wrestling with it if necessary, while all the while
regarding it with deep respect and even love.
Second, these essays taken together constitute an early version of
what I’ll call a “
masekhet Nashim
,”
a tractate Women – not to be con-
fused with the
Seder Nashim
of the
Mishnah, Tosefta,
and
Talmuds
.
The essays collect a vast amount of rabbinic material that presents
many views about women. Adding this diversity to the diversity of
the scholars who gathered this material and wrote the essays, we have
at least three levels of dialogue: the rabbinic sources with themselves,
the modern scholars and the sources, and the modern scholars
amongst ourselves. These three levels of dialogue in the
Commentary
allow us to “connect the dots” of different texts and come up
with new food for thought as well as new insight. The creation of a
multi-layered conversation that invites readers to engage in the
insight-producing work of intertextual exploration is, to my mind,
one of the truly exciting aspects of the “Post-biblical Interpretations.”
First, let’s gather some food for thought. We learn in the “Post-
biblical Interpretations” that the rabbis exempted women from the
obligation to recite the
Sh’ma
(
Gray, 1083; Hauptman, 1109), as well
as from the important
mitzvah
of
Torah
study (Hauptman, 1109).
These exemptions are disappointing in that they cut women off from
the principal Jewish occupation –
Torah
study – and the principal Jew-
ish affirmation, acceptance of the “yoke of the kingdom of Heaven.”
Yet we also learn that the rabbis were not unaware of women’s spiri-
tual capacities. The biblical Hannah is the rabbinic model for how to
pray (Gray, 1083); when we pursue this reference back into
Berakhot
31
a, we see that Rav Hamnuna said: “how many great laws are there
to be learned from these verses about Hannah.”
Moreover, we learn in two other places in the “Post-biblical In-
terpretations” that the rabbis did at times place men and women on
an even spiritual plane. The rabbis list two
mizvot
applicable to men
(
tzitzit
and
sukkah
)
and two
mitzvot
applicable to women (
hallah
and
Sabbath lights) together in referring to rewards for
mitzvot
performed
in the city (Setzer, 1211). The rabbis also pointed out that on
Yom
Kippur,
the High Priest would wear four garments symbolizing the
four Matriarchs, in addition to offering three sacrifices representing
the three Patriarchs (Labovitz, 694-695). Taking all this rabbinic ma-
terial together, we see a tension: exemption of women from the
Jewishly-defining
mitzvot
of
Torah
study and
Sh’ma
,
and yet an ap-
parent unwillingness to make women’s spirituality secondary to men’s
in all cases. This tension invites further reflection – not apologetics,
but reflection based on our willingness to let ourselves see multiple
points of view about women in the rabbinic corpus without suc-
cumbing to the temptations of either apologetics or dismissal.
Second, let’s derive some new insight. Looking at Judith Abrams’s
discussion of famous Talmudic story at
Bava Metzia
59
b (761), we
see that she tells us that Imma Shalom’s attention “was diverted,”
which had a disastrous consequence. Although it may seem to be of
little consequence, let’s ask: What caused the diversion? When we go
to
Bava Metzia
59
b itself, we see that one explanation offered for the
diversion is that Imma Shalom went to give bread to a poor man at the
door. Looking deeper, we see that giving bread to poor people at the
door is how the
Talmud Bavli
most typically represents women as
doing
tsedaqah
.
Moreover, the
Talmud
represents this sort of personal,
in-kind
tsedaqah
as superior to men’s monetary
tsedaqah
because a
poor person benefits immediately from food, but not from money,
which is at least one step removed from food. Following this intrigu-
ing idea further, I find that Mrs. Mar Uqba makes that very point in
explaining to her husband why he was burned in the course of a
tsedaqah
venture gone awry while she was not (Ket. 67b), and Abba
Hilqiah also makes this point in explaining why his wife was a more
